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JOINT CUSTODY
JOHN G. TAUSSIG,,JR. * AND JOHN T. CARPENTER IV**
I. INTRODUCTION
As divorce has become more prevalent during the twentieth
century, courts and legislatures have increasingly been faced with
the task of determining the fates of children of divided homes. The
approved formulas for deciding which parent should be awarded
custody have varied as widely as the social and psychological
theories upon which they are based. The purpose of this article is to
identify the current trend in custody results, to define a type of
custody arrangement called joint custody, which allows both
parents to contribute to the rearing of the children of a dissolved
marriage, to recommend its judicial approval, and to propose a
statute containing a presumption favoring joint custody.
II. CURRENT TRENDS IN CUSTODY RESULTS
Some parents, after dissolution of their marriage, are able to
agree on a workable solution to the problems of child control and
*B.S., Colorado State University. 1955. 1.1.B.. University of Colorado Law School. 1958:
J.D., University ofColorado la School. 1968: Senior Partner in the law firm ofTaussig& Flowers.
P.C., Boulder. Colorado.
*A.B., Princeton University. 1973: Law Clerk in the law firm of Taussig & Flowers. P.C..
Boulder. Colorado.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
custody. Far too often, however, divorcing parents cannot or will
not agree on who is to make the important as well as the trivial
decisions on child rearing, or where the children are to live. In the
latter case, the unpleasant task of choosing between the competing
parents has, in the United States, traditionally fallen on the trial
court's shoulders. In the midst of a maelstrom of heart-wrenching
emotion, the trial judge is faced with the awesome responsibility of
placing the children in an environment where they can develop
without suffering unnecessarily due to the divorce. As the Supreme
Court of Colorado has stated, "[n]o question ever submitted to the
courts calls for greater care or wisdom in its decision, and none is
more far-reaching in its consequences." ' This decision is even
more difficult because "[a] decree of divorce with its custody
provisions cannot contrive a satisfactory substitute for a happy
parental home, ''2 and "there are no reliable, empirical studies that
can be used to predict the consequences of an adult's assumed
future behavior upon a child." 3 Since the beginning of the
twentieth century, the American judicial system has searched for,
but failed to find, an acceptable solution to this dilemma.
The common-law rule awarded custody of children to the
father, on the theory that he had a property interest in their
services.4 This rule was abrogated in the early twentieth century by
state statutes, which typically provided that neither parent had a
prima facie right to custody. 5 Since the state had an interest in
fostering the growth of its future citizens, trial courts were directed
to consider primarily the "best interests" of the child.6 In the close
I. Searle v. Searle, 115 Colo. 266, 273, 172 P.2d 837, 840 (1946) (tuoting Brok v. Brock, 123
Wash. 450, -, 212 P. 550,551 (1923)).
2. McGetrick v. McGetrick, 204 Or. 645, , 284 P.2d 352,'355 (1955) (quoting Flanagan v.
Flanagan, 195 Or. 611, 621, 247 P.2d 212, 217 (1952)).
3..J.B. v. A. B., W . Va. -_ .242 S.E.2d 248, 255 (1978).
4. johnson v. Terry 34 Conn. 259, 263 (1867); Risting v. Sparboe, 179 Iowa 1133, __ , 162
N.W. 592, 594 (1917). See also 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES* 193-94; Jones, The Tender Years Doctrine:
Survey andAnalysis, 16.1. FAM. L. 695, 696 (1978).
5. For cases discussing some of these statutes see Risting v. Sparboe, 179 Iowa 1133, 162 N.W.
592 (1917); Sinquefield v. Valentine, 159 Miss. 144, 132 So. 81 (1931), Rufer v. Rufer, 67 N.D.
67, 269 N.W. 741 (1931). See also Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15,.
FAM. L. 423, 429(1977).
In discussing one such statute, one court made this all too accurate comment: '"[in the effort to
escape from the airhitrary rule laid clown by the common law as to the father's right, the danger is lest
the pendulum swing too far, under modern decisions, the other way." Sinquefield v. Valentine, 159
Miss 144, __ , 132 So. 81, 83 (1931) (quoting Hibbette v. Baines, 78 Miss. 695, , 29 So. 80,
81 (1900)).
6. Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 111 P. 21 (1910). In Wilson the Colorado Supreme Court
stated:
In controversies affecting the custody of an infant, the interest and welfare of the
child is the primary and controlling question by which the court must be guided. This
rule is based upon the theory that the state must perpetuate itself, and good citizenship
is essential to that end. Though nature gives to parents the right to the custody of their
own children and such right is scarcely less sacred than the right to life and liberty, and
224
.JOINT CUSTODY 225
case, where both parents were relatively equally fit, trial judges
were left with virtually undirected discretion, and the responsibility
of making a choice was often based on nothing more than a hunch.
In order to make wise decisions in good faith, the judiciary
turned to the neophyte social sciences of the day, and to the
consensus of American culture. The "tender years" doctrine
resulted7 and soon took root in case law8 and in statute. 9
In its earliest days, the tender years doctrine awarded custody
is manifested in all animal lifi, vet among mankind, the necessitv for government has
fbrced the recognition of the rule, that the perpetuity of the state is the first
considecration, and parental authcritv itself is subordinate to this supreme power. It is
recognized that: "The moment a chiId is born, it owes allegia ce to the government of
the country of its birth, and is entztlecd to the protection of that government. And such
government is obligated by its duty of protection, to i'onsuIt the welfare, cnfort and
interest ofsuch child in regulating its custody during the period of its minoritv."
Id. at 465, 111 P. at 25.
Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court stated, "iun this class of cases three interests are involved,
of the parents, of the state, and of the child, and of these, the most important and controlling is that
of the child; for by a proper decision as to that, the other interests are best subserved." Risting v.
Sparboe, 179 Iowa 1133, -, 162 N.W. 592,594(1917).
7. Opinions approving the tender years doctrine rarely reler to any theoretical basis. Typical
language giving reasons for adhering to the doctrine is purely tinclusory. See infra note I0. An
exception is this West Virgintia Supreme Court oI Appeals pronouncement:
The socialization patterns which prevailed uring the trmative years of the current
generation of parents with young children encouraged women to develop certain
attituCles such as surpassing patience and a high tolerance for a close, grating,
aesthetically unpleasant, and frequenty ppressive, yet nmetheless absolttely
indispensable physical relationship with children. We are not being normative in our
reliance upon the socialization proiess. we merelv avail ourselves of it for the benefit of
young children in the same way that i physicist relics upon thi law of gravity or a
doctor relies upon osmosis. When the socialization pattern changes to the extent that
the traditional roles of mother and fiathir arc reversed with su h frequency ihat It,
presumption no longer bears any relation to reality, then the law. pirfiir'e of changed
circumstances will inevitably change.
J. B.v. A.B., -W. Va. -, , 242 S.E.2d 248, 252-53 (1978).
8. Jurisdictions vary strikingly in the evolution of case aw and statutes andi the effecis oleach
upon the other. Some state appellate courts approved the tender years do trin in seeming disregard
of contrar legislative intent. See, e *,,, Clark v. Clark, 217 Va. 924, 234 S.E.2d 266 (1977); Htirper v.
Harper, 217 Via. 477, 229 S.E.2d 875 (1976); Burnside v. Burnside, 216 Va. 691, 222 S.E.2d :52(
(1976).
In some states, case law seteteil to follow legislatise enatnt in adopting the doctrine, ser infra
note 9. while in some i risdict ions case law approving the doctrine predlated any mention of or
reliance on statute. Seer.*, McGarraugh v. Mc-arraugh, 177 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1943),
(making no mention of any statute) and Hamer v. Hamer, 184 S.W. 2d 492 (Tex. Ct. App. 1945),
(citing a Texas statute expressing the tender years doctrine). For cases which do not cite a statutory
preference for the tender years doctrine see Kilgore v. Kilgore, 54 Ala. App. 336, 308 So. 2d 249
(Civ. App. 1975); Wonsetler v. Wonsetler, 240 So. 2d 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Stillmunkes v.
Stillmunkes, 245 Iowa 1082, 65 N.W.2d 366 (1954); Lewis v. Lewis, 217 Kan. 336, 537 P.2d 204
(1975); Babb v. Babb, 293 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1956); Jones v. Jones, 344 So. 2d 414 (La. Ct. ofApp.
1977); Sheil v. Sheil, 29 App. Div. 2d 950, 289 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1968); McGetrick v. McGetrick, 204
Or. 645, 284 P.2d 352 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Hubbell v. Hubbell, 176 Pa. Super. l80,-107
A.2d 388 (1954); Cherry v. Cherry, 384 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964); and Lundeen v. 'frim-
minger, 209 Va. 548, 165 S.E.2dl285 (196 9 ).
9. These statuts took siveral fnrtis. The Arizona ain] Nirth )akota statuties were almost
identiical. The Arizona situtc providcd as follows:
As between parents adversely claiming the custody or guardianship, neither parent is
entitled to it as of right, but, other things being equal, if the child is of tender years, it
shall be given to the mother. If the child is of an age requiring education and
preparation for labor or business, then to the father.
226 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
and control to the mother due to a nearly unrebuttable 10
presumption that a child of "tender years" 1I needed and craved the
peculiar love which only a mother could give. 12 Some writers
attributed the tender years doctrine to the sociological changes in
the gender role brought about by the industrial revolution. With
the husband more often concerned with making a living away from
the family, domestic supervision was predominately the mother's
prerogative, by default, if for no other reason. 13
At its strongest, the tender years doctrine has prevailed in the
face of statutory language to the contrary, 14 but as the twentieth
century has passed, the effect of the tender years doctrine has been
weakened. For example, many states have at one time or another
restricted the doctrine's use to situations where two suitable parents
presented similar living conditions, with the result that the trial
court considered the doctrine's preference for the mother only if it
found that all other factors were equal,' 5 or at least that both
ARIZ. REv. STAT. S 14-846 (B) (current child custody statute at ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 25-332
(1976)).
For cases interpreting S 14-846 see Dunbar v. Dunbar, 102 Ariz. 352, 429 P.2d 949 (1967);
Olsetyn v. Olsetyn, 20 Ariz. App. 545, 514 P.2d 498 (1976).
The North Dakota statute provided as follows:
As between parents adversely claiming the custody or guardianship, neither parent is
entitled to it as of right, but other things being equal, if the child is of tender years, it
should be given to the mother, and if it is of an age to require preparation for labor or
business, then to the father.
N.D. CENT. CODE s 30-10-06(2) (repealed 1973).
10. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated, "[tjhe needs of a child of tender years are best
served by its mother, and, unless compelling reasons appear to the contrary, such child should be
committed to the care and custody of its mother." Commonwealth ex rel, IHtubbell v. Hubbell, 176
Pa. Super. 186, -, 107 A.2d 388, 390 (1954) (emphasis added).
11. Most courts do not attempt to define the age at which the doctrine ceases to apply. But see
Dunbar v. Dunbar, 102 Ariz. 352, 429 P.2d 949 (1967), and DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919
(N.D. 1975), which looked at statutes which seem to indicate that the tender years doctrine is no
longer applicable to a child as he prepares to make his way in the world. See also Mansfield v.
Mansfield, 230 Minn. 574, 42 N.W.2d 315 (1950) (suggests that older boy needs father's com-
panionship); E.C.S. v. J.D.L., 529 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (father's guidance and
discipline important for boy of sixteen); Baer v. Baer, 51 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932) (twelve
year old is no longer of tender years); J.B. v. A.B., __ W. Va. ,242 S.E.2d 248 (1978) (upper
limit for tender years is fourteen).
12. One court described the nature of the mother's love by stating, "[tihere is buit a twilight
zone between a mother's love and the atmosphere of heaven, all things being equal, no child shiulc
be deprived of the maternal influence unless it be shown there are special or extraordinarv reasons for
so doing." Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938).
13. See i fra note 24.
14. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 217 Va. 924, 234 S.E.2d 266 (1977): Harper v. Harper. 217 Va.
477. 229S.E.2d 875 (1976); Burnside v. Burnside. 216 Va. 691, 222 S. E.2d 529(1976).
15. Wonsetler v. Wonsetler, 240 So. 2d 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Davis v. Davis, 354
S.W.2d 526 (Mo. App. 1962): Hamer v. Hamer, 184 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Ct. App. 1944).
Maryland courts credited the tender years doctrine with even less weight just befor its abolition
in 1974. After concluding that the maternal preference doctrine was to serve a limitcd function as a
tiebreaker, the court stated as follows:
We concede that it is unlikely that litigants will have parental qualitics so equally
balanced that resort to the maternal preference will h'Ge necessarv. It shioul therefore
,JOINT CUSTODY 227
parents were fit and proper. 16
It is not clear whether the modern "no preference" statutes
are a cause or an effect of the decline of the tender years doctrine, or
both, but certainly, as more states have enacted statutes providing
for an equal parental right to control and custody,' 7 the tender
years doctrine has been falling from favor in appellate court
opinions. These opinions usually mention a "no preference"
statute as one reason for disapproving the tender years doctrine.18
Some states still cling to the tender years doctrine, 19 while some
courts have rejected it without reference to statute or constitution. 20
Just as social sciences and the state of American culture gave
rise to the tender years doctrine, changes in the American culture
and the pronouncements of social science apparently underlie its
demise. People in all walks of life have more leisure time today than
their predecessors did fifty years ago, and fathers are spending their
leisure time on child rearing. One result is that fathers today have
more effect on their children's development, 21 more of a stake in
not be expressed as a consideration at all, except in those limited instances where it
would be impossible to decide upon the evidentiary facts.
Cooke v. Cooke, 21 Md. App. 376, ,319A.2d841,844(1974).
16. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 45 Wash. 2d 394, 275 P.2d 421 (1954).
17. Some states which have or have had a statute providing for an equal parental right to
custodv and control of children of a divorce include Arizona. California. Colorado. Connecticut,
Hawaii. Illinois, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York. North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Texas.
It is interesting to note that the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Art has no uh provision. The
Colorado Iegislature repealed the existing "no preference" statute when the Uniform Dissolution
Act was adopted, but results similar to those under the statute have been based on Article II. section
29 of the Colorado Constitution, prohibiting discrimination based on sex, and on the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. See In re Marriage of Franks. 189 Colo. 499. 542 P.2d
845 (1975), slar denied, 423 U.S. 1043 (1976); Menne v. Menne, __ Colo. .572 P.2d 472
(1977); Pacheco v. Pacheco, 38 Colo. App. 181, 554 P.2d 720 (1976). In contrast, Indiana did not
repeal its "no preference" statute when the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act was enacted. This
statute has continued to be cited in cases. In re Marriage of Myers, __ Ind. App. -, 387
N.E.2d 1360 (1979).
In North Dakota. a statute providing, "[bletween the mother and father. whether natural or
adoptive, there is no presumption as to who will better promote the best interests and welfsre of the
child," took effect in 1979. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.1 (Supp. 1979).
18. See. e.,,., Neal v. Neal. 92 Cal. App. 3d 834, 155 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1979): Raver v. Raver. 32
Colo. App. 400, 512 P.2d 637 (1973); Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 387 N.E.2d 1019, 407
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978).
19. To the best knowledge of these writers, at least Alabama. Florida. Louisiana. and Virginia
still approve the tender years doctrine.
20. Folsom v. Folsom. 228 Ga. 536, 186 S.E.2d 752 (1972): F.F. v. F.F.. 37 App. Div. 2d 893.
325 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1971). New York cases disapproving the tender years doctrine decided after F.F.
p. F. F. have mentioned New York domestic relations law section 240 (no prima facie right to custody
in eitherparent). Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978).
21. Starkeson v. Starkeson. __ N.H. __ 397 A.2d 1043 (i079) (Douglas. J., dissenting).
Another court noted the fathers' effect on their children's development when it stated the following:
The court is persuaded that the role of the father is no less important in his daughters'
lives than that ofthe mother.... Girls need to learn no (only what it will he like to be a
wsotsan, but what to look for and expect in a man. In the Dodrd fhmilv, the father has
dominated the mother, has fbrced his views on her. threatened her and belittled her. It
is important, for the children's emotional health, that the' view their mother as the
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the children's control, 22 and more to lose if deprived of control and
custody, as do their children.2 3 As more women join the work force,
the "mother as homemaker" justification for the doctrine is greatly
weakened. 24 In addition, social science tells us that most, if not all,
of the benefits of "mother love" can be conferred on a child by a
parent of either sex.
25
C'(npetent person she has shown hers'lf it Ie and their lather as a lerson who can
treat women with kin(hss an rvslpec(-.
Dodd v. Dodd. 93 Misc. 2(1 641. __. 403 N.Y.,.2(d 401. 40I-07 (1978) Contra.J.B. v. AR....
W. Va... 2412 S.E.2d 248 (19781). For;i collection and thiot iIs (10 the psychological imtportance
of the father-child relationship, see Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15,J.
FAN,. 1. 423. 448-57 (1977): ertot Note, Dd Custodt, o/ ChThhrco .1/Icr Their Parents' )ivorce, 8.
F,,s . I. 58. 60 (1068).
22. Dobb v. Dobb, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1978). Contra. J.B. v. A.B., __ W.
Va. _. 242 S.E.2d 248 (1978).
2:1. Starkeson v. Starkeson, __ N.H. __, 397 A.2d (143 (1979) (Douglas, ,., dissenting).
The dissent in Starkeson noted the potential loss to the chilt when it stated, "It here is solid evidence
that iiios; children experience pain when their tilsihers are absent .... Children view their father's
alseti e is il)tnlonment, and this may lead to erratic emntional behavior. The children who arc free
to develop lull relationships with both parents hitre best alitr divorc e." Id. at __ , 397 A.2d at
1046. See Wallerstein & Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: The Adolewcent Experience, in THE C1iLo iN
His FANin.Y, 479-505 (E. Anthony & C. Koupernik eds. 1974).
24. Starkeson v. Starkeson, __ N.H. . 397 A.2d 1043 (1979) (DouglasJ., dissenting). In
Starketon a dissenting opinion elaborated on women in the work force when it stated:
The tender years doctrine developed when industrialization split the labor force
into paid labor for men and unpaid home labor for women.... The classic contrast
between the breadwinner and the bottlewarmer created "an ideology that now
victimizes.. 0 both (sexes).". . . Viewed from a modern perspective, this theory
appears sexist. By capitalizing on the theory that "someone has to take care of the
children,." society can attempt to "keep women in their place.'" Women,.however, are
joining the labor force in ever-increasing numbers. Fifty percent of all women and
sixty-seven percent of divorcd wonri are employed .... The hand that rocks the
cradle is. in short. also punching a time clock. Our family structure is evolving into
dial career households where parenting will and should he shared even if the marriage
does not remain intact.
Id. at __ , 397 A.2d at 1046. (quoting M. Roman. The Disposable Parent. manuscript of lecture
presented at the Association of Family Conciliation Courts, Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 11, 1977,
at 4-8.)See alo.Jines v.Jines, 63 I1l. App. 3d 564, 380 N.E.2d 440 (1978).
25. As one court stated when it found that the tender years presumption denied the father of his
right to equal protection of the law:
later dcecisitns have recognized that this view Ithe tender years presumption] is
inconsistent with informed application of the best interests of the child doctrine and
out of touch with contemporary thought about child development and male and female
stereotypes.
In Garrett v. Garrett... the court stated: "The rule giving the mother preferential
right to custody is considerably softened by the realization that 'all things never are
exactly equal' and is predicated upon the acts of motherhood - not the f]act qf
motherhood. Likewise, the rule will yield if the welfare of the children demands it,
because this is not a presumption of law but a simple fact of life gleaned from human
experience, and the courts are not timid in entrusting children into their father's care
and custody when their best interests will be served thereby. " (Citations omitted and
emphasis added.)
Eminent psychologists and anthropologists, including Margaret Mead, have also
acknowledged and asserted that both female and male parents are equally able to
provide care and perform child-rearing functions.
"At present, the specific biological situation of the continuing relationship of the
child to the biological mother and its need for care by human beings are being
hopelessly confused in the ... insistence that the child and mother or mother surrogate
must never be separated; that all separation even for a few days is ultimately damaging
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Thus, although mothers are still awarded sole custody of
young children in ninety percent of all cases,2 6 a definite trend
towards a weakening of the appellate, judicial, and statutory
approval of the presumption in favor of mothers can be discerned in
most jurisdictions.
The same courts approving the tender years doctrine have
generally disapproved awards of "divided," "alternating," or
"split" custody.2 7 The disapproval has often been voiced without
any discussion of its reason. Thus, a Texas Appellate Court
disapproved divided custody for reasons which are "obvious. ' 28
The discussions that have been on point have seemed to draw on
infant social science and cultural consensus, much like the
discussions of the tender years doctrine, and, until recently, to
assume that children would be harmed by the lack of
environmental stability if custody was not vested in a sole
custodian. 29 Although contact with both parents was seen as
and that if long enough it does irreversible damage. This is a mere and subtle form of
anti-feminism which men - under the guise of exalting the importance of maternity
- are tying women more tightly to their children than has been thought necessary
since the invention of bottle feeding and baby carriages .... "
Studies of maternal deprivation have shown that the essential experience for the
child is that of mothering - the warmth, consistency and continuity of the
relationship rather than the sex of the individual who is performing the mothering
function.
State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, __ , 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 289-90(1973).
26. Starkeson v. Starkeson, __ N.H. -,_ 397 A.2d 1043. 1046 (1979) (Douglas..J.
dissenting) (citing M. Roman, The Disposable Parent, manuscript of lecture presented at the
Association of Family Conciliation Courts, Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 11, 1977, at 2).
In an interesting case in which a father contested the constiiutiouillitv of the Colorado version of
the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act based on statistics concerning actual custody awards. the
Colorado Supreme Court had this to say:
Appellant's statistics do show that in a vast majority of the custody cases over the past
few years, the wife has been awarded custOdy of the children. From this he leaps to the
cintclusion that the courts improperly favor women in dissolution proceedings. What
the bare statistics do not show. however, is whether custody wsas contested or even
desired by the husbands in any significant number of cases. The fact of the grant of
custody itself has no great significance unless seen in light of the circumstances of the
case which underlies such grant. Appellant has failed to demonstrate that he was
discriminated against on the basis ofhis sex. We find no violation ofArt. I1, Sec. 29.
In re Mairriage of Franks, 189 Colo. 499, _ 542 P.2d 845. 852 (1975). sta denied, 423 U.S. 1043
(1976).
27. The variety and confusion of terms concerning child custody and control is truly
bewildering. The rarer terms include "splitting custody," Kilgore v. Kilgore, 54 Ala. App. 336.
308 So. 2d 249 (1975), and "possessory conservatorship," Adams v. Adams, 519 S.W.2d 502 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1975). We will adopt the definitional scheme proposed by Alexander Lincley. ".Joint
custody" means the child resides most of the year with one parent, and the spouses have joint
control. "Divided custody" means the child lives with each spouse for part of the year and during
that time that spouse has control of the child. "Split custody" means there are several children, and
custody of one or more is given to one spouse, and custody of the rest to the other spouse.l A.
L+INiiY, SE.PARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NTPTIAt. CONTRACTS § 14 at 60. (1977). Divided
custody is also known as alternating custody. See, e.g., Griffin v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 404, 75 S.E.2d
133 (1953).
28. MeGarrough v. McGarrough, 177 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. Ct. App. 1943).
29. See, e.g. Wood v. Wood, 400 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Brooks v. Brooks, 201 Va.
731, 113 S.E.2d 872 (1948).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
beneficial to most children, 0 custody was somewhat paradoxically
viewed as properly awarded to only one parent.31
The disapproval of divided custody is based in part on a lack of
definitional clarity. 32 Although cases and statutes speak of custody
and control, 33 many courts have traditionally spoken of custody as
a unitary concept, without differentiating between the rights of
control and decision making vis-a-vis a child's rearing, and the
right to have a child live in one's home. 4 Decisions deploring the
effects of "shuttling" on a child's health and development seem to
speak of custody most often in terms of the child's physical
environment.3 5
If a definition of custody acknowledges separable elements of
child-rearing, decision making, and physical residence; the conflict
in decisions between disapproval of divided custody on one hand,
and recognition of the benefit to children of contact with and
influence by both parents on the other, can be reconciled. In other
words, perhaps these cases have been approving joint decision
making, while disapproving extensive division of the child's
physical residence due to its supposed unsettling effect.
III. JOINT CUSTODY
Joint custody is usually not a fifty-fifty division of a child's
residence.3 6 Those courts that have grown to accept or favor joint
30. The Colorado Supreme Court commented on the child's need for both parents when it
stated:
The court must consider that the child is entitled to the love. advice, and training of
both father and mother, and the custody should be divided between parents exhibiting
great solicitude for the child if no good reason otherwise appears. In determining
what is for the best welfare of a child of tender years. the courts must consider not only
food, clothing, shelter, care, education, and environment. but must also hear in mind
that every such child is entitled to the love, nurture, advice and training ofboth father
and mother, and to deny to the child an opportunity to know, associate with. love, and
be loved by either parent, may be a more serious ill than to refise it in some part those
things which noney can bu.
Searlev. Searle. 115 Colo. 266. 273. 172 P.2d 837. 839-40(1946).
Some jurisdictions have given much \\eight to such considerations. See. .Casein v. Casin.
485 S.W.2d857 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972): Baerv. Baer, 51 S.W.2d873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932).
31. Rickard v. Rickard, 7 Wash. App. 907. 503 P.2d 763. 766(1973).
32. See supra note 27 for various definitions.
33. See, e.g., Koekrov x. Kockrow. 191 Neb. 657. 217 NAV.2d 89 (1974).
34. Searle v. Searle. 115 Colo. 266. 172 P.2d 837 (1946). One early case making this distinction
is Baer v. Baer, 51 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932). See also Dunbar \. Dunbar. 102 Ariz. 352. 429
P.2d 949 (1966).
35. An example of this sort of language can be found in Heltsley v. Heltslev. 242 S.W.2d 973
(Ky. 1951). which states that the usual deleterious effects of divided custod. arising from a child's
insecurity at being forced to move from home to home. were ameliorated by close proximity of the
homes of these parents. Id. at 973. Some cases have, however, placed the blame for instability in
divided custody on changes in control and superision. See. r.g.. McGetrick \. McGetrick. 204 Or.
645. 284 P.2d 352 (1955): Rickard v. Riekard. 7 Wash. App. 907. 503 P.2d 763 (1973).
36. Starkeson v. Starkeson. __ N.H. __ . 397 A.2d 1043 (1979) (Douvlas..1.. dissenting).
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custody have done so based on a divided definition of custody with
separable elements of control and physical custody. 37 It follows
from this dual definition that a child can be allowed to benefit from
contact similar to pre-divorce contact with both parents, without
any necessity for a court to feel obligated to deprive the child of the
stability of fairly constant, familiar surroundings, by dividing the
time of the child's physical residence evenly between the parents. 38
As was the case with the tender years doctrine, developing
social science concepts and changing cultural norms have led and
informed the development of the joint custody doctrine. As noted
previously, at least one substitute for mother love exists - and that
is father love. 39 Fathers do typically have a direct role in child-
rearing which has greatly increased since the early 1900's.
Correspondingly, children, fathers, and mothers have a greater
amount of emotional investment to lose, and more damaging
trauma to suffer, if the father-child relationship is summarily
severed by an award of sole custody to the mother. 4  Similar
considerations apply if the father is given sole custody.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court emphasized that point when it stated, "lain award of
joint custody does not require that children spend three and one-halfclays per week with each parent,
but allows flexibilitv in the determination of the child's living situation." Id. at - , 397 A.2d at
1047. For example of factual situations depicted as joint custody, see infra note 38.
37. See, .,' Neal v. Neal. 92 Cal. App. 3d 834, 155 (:al. Rptr 157 (1979) and cascs cited
therein; Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E. 2d 1019, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978) and cases
cited t hcrein. Se supra note 27.
38. One court discussed the division ofa child's physical residence as follows:
Joint or divided custody decrees generally give both parents legal responsibility for the
child's care, but when physical or actual custody is lodged primarily in one parent,
custody may be "joint" in name only.
In the Perotti case, the parents were given shared responsibility, with physical
custody to the father, visitation to the mother. In Woicik, the child was to be in
Ioarding school in the winter, camp in the summer, with the parents sharing only the
child's vacation time. In Ross, custody was awarded to both parties on a temporary
basis, apparently to "afford the child an opportunity to atljust himself, in due time, to
one or both parents." Ross v. Ross, 4 Misc. 2d 399, 405, 149 N.Y.S.2d 585, 591. The
actual division of time was left to the parties, anti if the parties were unable to agree,
then sole custody was to be given to the father with week-end visitation rights to the
mother. In Odette: R v. l)ouglas R., the court directed the parties to make all
decisions jointly for the benelit of the children, but divided physical custody by
allowing the children to live with their father and visit their mother. In Krois, there was
court ordered .joint guidance for a boy of 17 and a handicapped girl of 20, but both
children were to remain physic ally with the father. In the Levy case, the court gave
joint control of a I 3-year-ol boy to both parents, but directed that he stay with his
mother for two years to give him a chance to decide where to live. In the Schack case,
where joint custodv was awarded, the children were to live with the mother from
Monday through Friday, the father m Saturday and Sunday, with vacation to be
split.
Doddv. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, __, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403-04 (1978).
39.See supra note 25.
40. One dissenting opin ion note(] the changed roles in child rearing when it stated the following:
Our family structure is evolving into dual career households, where parenting will and
shouhl be shared cven if the marriage does not remain intact....
Our current legal customs tend to make ex-parents of fathers, overburden
232 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Most writers still acknowledge the notion that stability is vital
to a child's adequate adaptation to the -parents' divorce. 4 1
Nevertheless, the best method for achieving maximum stability in
the child's post-divorce environment is in dispute. 42 After all, the
argument in favor of joint control goes, although parents do not
always agree on child-rearing decisions after divorce, such
disagreement does not usually make a child's environment
dangerously unstable before divorce. 43 The fact that the parents may
mothers, and deprive children of full emotional support from both parents. The sole
parent, usually the mother, must bear tremendous psychic and economic costs, and
must fulfill all family functions. Children cannot provide emotional support to a single
parent, for their love is demanding of the parent rather than supportive. The sole
parent not only has to fulfill all family functions, but has little release from his or her
burden. Thus one parent becomes overburdened and the other, in a sense,
underburdened.
Starkeson v. Starkeson. __N.H. 397 A.2d 1043, 1046 (1979) (Douglas, .J., dissenting).
See supra note 23.
41. M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT (1978).
42. Those jurisdictions in the majority espouse the view that stability and security are usually
maximized by vesting one parent with custody and awarding visitation to the other. See supra notes
28, 29, 31.
Occasional opinions through the years have suggested that joint or divided custody would
increase a child's security after divorce. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia stated the
following:
The advisability of dividing or alternating the custody of the child has been seriously
considered. While there are certain disadvantages in such division., there are also
important advantages and benefits. It gives the child the experience of two separate
homes. The child is entitled to the love, advice, and training of both her father and her
mother. Frequent associations, contact, and friendly relations with both of her parents
will protect her future welfare if one of her parents should die. It gives recognition to
the rights of parents who have performed obligations as parents.
Mullen v. Mullen. 188 Va. 259, __ 49 S. E.2d 349. 355 (1948).
More recently the Supreme Court, Queens County. of New York stated:
In the posture of this case, were this court to refuse to award "joint custody" to both
parents, the custody issue would have to be litigated in what could become a most
caustic atmosphere. The emerging bitterness and emotional explosions inherent in
these tense matters would unquestionably contaminate the future relationship of the
parents. Such contamination would infiltrate and spread eventually to the children.
with its resulting negative effect on their future security, stability and sense of well-
being. Clearly, such an unfortunate result would be most antagonistic to the svery in-
terests that this court is sworn to protect.
Moreover, common sense and experience suggests that the traumatic upheavals
brought about by a "broken home" are difficult enough for young children or even
older ones, to understand and accept. By contrast the concept of "joint custody" can
serve to give that measure of psychological support and uplift to each parent which
would communicate itself to the children in measures of mutual love, mutual attention
and mutual training. The string of security and stability that would flow from mother
to child to father, with "joint custody" serving as the emotional fulcrum, would but
strengthen the parent-child unit in what otherwise could be a completely destroyed
marital home. The parents of these young children expect no less from this court than
the award to them of "joint custody. " The court, in the interests of.justice and the
infants involved, can order no less. Let "joint custody" therefore issue in accordance
with this decision.
Perotti v. Perotti, 78 Misc. 2d 131, __ 355 N.Y.S.2d 68, 72-73 (1974).
43. Starkeson v. Starkeson, -N.H.-, 397 A.2d 1043 (1979) (Douglas.J., dissenting).
This objection to joint custody presumes that parents who could not reconcile conflicts
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disagree after divorce if they both have a say in child rearing is not
nearly as disruptive as the change occasioned by a totally new
environment in which one parent rules supreme. In addition, a
joint custody decree can reduce the amount of "bartering" (using
custody as a tool to further other ends), and the incidence of one
parent's disparaging the other parent in order to turn the children
against that parent. 44
Obviously, children are better off if the parents can agree to
share child-rearing control and physical custody. Some authorities
assert that joint custody, however defined, cannot work without
parental agreement.4 5  The problem with this assertion as an
-unvarying rule is that the children's need for love and influence
from both parents does not disappear in the face of the parent's
inability to agree. This realization has caused some courts to
suggest enforced joint control even in the absence of agreement, 46
while living together are even less likely to resolve conflicts while living apart.... This
argument ignores the fact that parents disagree on childrearing issues whether or not
they are married and living in the same household. Professor Roman found that there
is no empirical data which shows that parents cannot isolate their marital conflict from
their parental responsibilities....
Indeed, joint custody may limit disagreements to childrearing concerns rather
than marital problems, which may have become more frequent during marriage
because of the daily contact between the mother and father.
Id. at __, 397 A.2d at 1047 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. Perotti v. Perotti, 78 Misc.2d 131, 355 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1974). In Perotti the court observed the
following:
[Mlany children have been innocent dupes and victims of those parents who have used
their custodial rights as bargaining agents and instruments of intimidation in seeking
an unfair advantage over the other parent. Therefore, where joint custody could
)roperly be employed. would it not serve to remove the psychological "abrasiveness"
that one parent may utilize as against the other?
Id. at __, 355 N. Y.S.2d at 72.
45. Braiman v. Braiman. 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978). In
Brainan the court recognized the need for agreement when it stated the following:
It is understandable, therefore, that joint custody is encouraged primarily as a
voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature
civilized fashion. . . . As a court-ordered arrangement imposed upon already em-
battled and embittered parents, accusing one another of serious vices and wrongs,
joint custody can only enhance familial chaos.
More than four years since their separation, the parents are evidently still unable
to manage their common problems with their children, let alone trust each other. In-
stead, they continue to find fault and accuse. They have failed to work out between
themselves even a limited visitation with the children. To expect them to exercise the
responsibility entailed in sharing their children's physical custody at this time seems
beyond rational hope. It would, moreover, take more than reasonable self-restraint to
shield the children, as they go from house to house, from the ill feelings, hatred, and
disrespect each parent harbors towards the other.
Idat 589-90, 378 N.E.2d at 1021, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
46. SeeStamper v. Stamper, 3 FAM. L. REP. 2541(Mich. BNA 1977),in which the court adopted
the recommendation of the child's attorney that the mother have physical custody during the school
year. the father to have liberal visitation: with a switch in physical custody to the father during the
summer. The parents were to have joint custody as to control. This decree was entered in the face of
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and some writers and courts to propose a statutory47 or judicial48
presumption in favor of joint custody.
Although complete agreement between parents to implement
joint custody may not be necessary, effective joint custody requires
two capable parents with some degree of respect for one another's
abilities as parents, together with a willingness and ability to work
together to reach results on major decisions in a manner similar to
the way married couples make decisions. 49 It is believed that there
are many families fitting these criteria. Additionally, there are
other families that would benefit from joint custody after a
supervised delay.
It cannot be ignored that joint custody would require sub-
stantial adjustment, effort, imagination, cooperation, compromise,
and maturity; but so do courtship, marriage, divorce, standard
custody, and parenting in general.
For these reasons, we propose a statute containing a
presumption to give both parents an important voice in child-
rearing decisions.
Like the present system, the determination of the
appropriateness of joint custody for specific families would be the
task of the trial bench. 50 The task would be difficult, and the
process imperfect, as it already is. But trial judges today
undoubtedly struggle with custody decisions because of their "all or
trial court findings that both parents wer less fit than the average. See also Odette R. v. Douglas R.,
91 Misr.2d 792, 399 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1977). See Supra note 5.
47. Language in statutes enacted as a refutation of the common-law preference for the father, see
supra note 5, and to make both parents joint guardians of the children concerned have not been cited
in support of a prefrrencc for joint custodv to the best of the writer's knowledge. See. e.g.,
Antedomenico v. Antedornenico. 142 Conn. 558. 115 A.2d 659 (1959): Sinquefield v. Valentine, 159
Miss. 144, 132 So. 81 (1931).
A California statute which took eflect on January I. 1980, includes at preference for Joint
ctistoly. The changes that this statute will cause on actual custodv decisions are uncertain. See 1979
Cal. Le gis. Serv. 683 (West) (to be codified as CAtL. CmV. COnE 4600.5 (West)). See also Griffin v.
Griffin, 237 N.C. 404, 75 S.E.2d 133 (1953). mentioning a statutorv reference to alternating
cusidv '.
48. Recent authority includes Perotti v. Perotti, 78 Misc. 2d 131, 355 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1974).
where the! court states" '[iln all cases there shall be no prinia facit right to the custody of the child in
either parent.... ' " Id.
"Clearly, then, the parties in a matrimonial action, prior to any judicial determination directing
custody, are cloaked with the mantle of 'joint custody' of the infant issue." Id. at _ , 355
N.Y.S.2d at 70. In Starkeson, the dissent stated the following concerning a presumption of joint
custod': "Itlhe consideration of a lresumptinn of joint custod b' trial judges and attorni\'s tia"
further tihe best interests of children in divorce cases and assure tha't equalits of rights inder ithe lass'
in this State will not be abridged or denied because of sex." Starkeson v Starkeson, __ N. H __ ,
_ 397 A.2d 1043, 1048 (1979) (Douglas,.J., dissenting).
See also MandatoryJoint Custody Bill Faces Opposition in Massachusetts. 2 FAst. L. REP. 2561 (BNA
1976).
49. "Of course, if the level of parental conflict is so high that the parents are enotionally unable
to assume.joint custody, sole custody will still be appropriate." Starkeson v. Starkeson. - N. H.
..... 397 A.2d 1043, 1048 (1979). (Douglas, J.. dissenting). See also Fuhrman v. Fuhrman,
254 N.W.2d 97, I00 (N.D. 1977).
50. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-106(Supp. 1979).
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nothing" aura and results. A presumption in favor of joint custody
would ease this pressure on the trial bench, thus allowing judges
greater latitude in choosing the best possible custody solution in
each case.
Dealing with unresolved details of physical placement would
be similar to the present determination of the details of visitation.
Usually, most important details in a joint custody determination
are worked out by the parents and merely presented to the court for
its approval. Even if the problems of adjudication are increased, the
benefit to the concerned families should offset an increase in effort
as to quality and quantity from the trial bench and bar.
IV. PROPOSED STATUTE
The proposed statute reads as follows:
In cases of dissolution of marriage where there are
minor children, the trial court shall, unless it finds that it
would be detrimental to the child, award the right to
make child-bearing decisions jointly to both parents.
The specific arrangement of the joint custody shall
be set by agreement of the parties which the court shall
accept and approve unless it finds that the agreement of
the parties is unconscionable. 51 A lack of agreement
between the parents may be taken into account by the
court in deciding whether to award joint child-rearing
rights. Aspects not agreed upon by the parties shall be
decided by the court.
In determining the unresolved details where joint
custody is awarded, whether to award joint custody, and
the arrangements and details of custody and visitation the
court on hearing shall determine the matters consistent
with the best interests of the child, parents, and society, in
that order. The court shall consider all relevant factors;
the wishes of the child's parents as to his custody; the
wishes of the child as to his custodian; the interaction and
inter-relationship of the child with his parents, his
siblings, and any other person who may significantly
affect the child's best interests; the child's adjustment to
51. Such unconscionability is to be defined as follows: -[al tourt mav set aside ;Is in-
conscionable any agreement that is not 'fair, reasonable and just.1'" In re Marriage of Wigner,
- Colo. App. , 572 P.2d 495, 496 (1977).
235
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
his home, school, and community; and the court shall not
consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not
affect his relationship to the child. 52
In cases where the parents have joint custody, they
shall collectively determine the child's upbringing,
including his education, health care, and religious
training, subject to court supervision with power of
modification. 53
The purpose of the statute as proposed is to create a
presumption of joint parental control of child-rearing decisions
without forcing joint control in cases in which parents absolutely
cannot get along, or for some other reason one parent should be
excluded from child-rearing rights and responsibilities. No special
recommendation is made for physical custody in order to avoid
adverse reaction to the statute based on fears of damaging the
children due to an unstable environment ("shuttling").
It should be obvious, however, that a parent who has little
contact with his children will not be able to contribute intelligently
to child-rearing decisions. A common solution is to provide one
"primary residence," for the school year (or the week) and one
"secondary residence" for the summer (or weekend). 54 The parent
with whom the child is not residing is usually afforded liberal
visitation rights. An alternative beginning to enjoy some
widespread use provides that the children stay in one home, with
the parents alternating between that home and another residence. 55
Due to the variety of familial situations, the physical residence of
the children is best left to the ingenuity of parents and the trial
judge, within the discretion of the court.
Determining the effect of such a statute in advance of
enactment is very difficult. Such a determination is even more
difficult than assessing the previously discussed effects of "no
preference" statutes on the tender years doctrine long after their
enactment. These writers assume that a joint custody statute would
have some effect on custody awards, however, and profess the hope
that such a statute would be employed by the trial courts to benefit
all parties to every dissolution of marriage.
52. These relevant factors are codified at Coto. RE'. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1973).
53. SceCot-o. REV. STAT. § 14-10-130(1973).
54. Se supra note 38 for one court's discussion of this solution.
55. In Fuhrman v. Fuhrman. 254 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1977). the trial court ordered a plan where
the children would reside in the family residence and the parents would alternate residing with the
children on a monthlv basis. The North Dakota Supreme Court remanded the case because the




The following is an example ofa joint custody agreement used
by the authors of this article:
The parties have carefully weighed the question of the custody
of the minor children. In doing so, they have been guided solely by
considerations touching upon the best interest and welfare of the
children. They are convinced that the following disposition will be
for their best interest.
Accordingly, the parties will exercise jointly custody and
control of the minor children of the marriage including but not
limited to the powers set forth in Colorado Revised Statutes 1973,
§ 14-10-130(1).
It is the desire of the parties hereto to afford their minor
children, as nearly as is possible, residual to dissolution of their
marriage, the benefits of being raised with substantial contact with
both parents. It is therefore agreed that as nearly as possible, the
parties will mutually consult with each other regarding decisions of
the type that parents who live together would confer on in regard to
child raising.
The parties hereto recognize that the court has continuing
jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the children herein; and
upon any failure of the parties hereto to agree as to specifics or
define generalities, either party may apply to the court for
resolution. However, the parties believe and are committed to the
proposition that the various decisions pertaining to the raising of
the children can be made jointly by them in an informal manner.
The parties agree that they will make every endeavor to resolve
differences, if any, without court intervention.
At this time the children have a primary residence with the
wife. This primary residential status will continue with an alternate
residence with husband. The children will be with husband and
wife respectively at this time in a manner set forth in Exhibit "A"
attached hereto.
Neither party shall remove either child from either the State of
Colorado or the County of Boulder for residential purposes without
the consent of the other party. The foregoing will not limit the right
of the parties to take the children with them any place
geographically for vacations that do not interfere with school and
other important schedules. However, the parties will confer with
one another regarding any prolonged vacation plans with the
children.
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Each party agrees to keep the other party informed at all times
of the whereabouts of the children, and welfare and general concern
thereof.
Both parties agree that they will support the other party in all
aspects of parenting and parental decisions, and not demean the
other parent in any manner.
56
EXHIBIT A
The children will be with husband on alternate long
weekends, commencing Thursday afternoon and ending Tuesday
morning, except for vacations and holidays otherwise scheduled
below.
In regard to three holidays of primary concern to the parents
herein, namely Christmas Eve and Day, New Year's Eve and Day,
and the Thanksgiving extended weekend; in the year 1979-80 wife
will have the children for the Christmas holiday including one-half
the children's school vacation, and the husband will have the
children for the New Year's holiday and the other one-half of the
children's school vacation, and for the Thanksgiving holiday. This
will be alternated each year hereafter and these holiday schedules
supersede the regular schedule.
Other holidays (e.g., birthdays, Mother's Day, Father's Day,
Fourth ofJuly, etc.) will be enjoyed as per their occurrence with the
schedule set forth above except as otherwise modified by the
parties. The parties will endeavor to adjust the regular schedule
and provide each with a reasonable share of such holidays to the
extent that the formal schedule .does not so provide from time to
time.
The foregoing schedule is intended as a guide but may be
modified at any time by the parties' mutual consent. This may be
as minor as a verbal agreement to alter matters by an hour or by
days. Also, the parties will cooperate in making the children
available for vacations with each parent of an extended nature as
well as brief excursions. The parties will at all times cooperate and
plan and will make the children readily available to the other party
on transitions as well as cooperate in every manner to render any
transitions as smooth and convenient to all parties as possible.
Unless otherwise agreed, in transitional period the children will be
made available in the location of the residence.
56. For another joint custody agreement see I A. iINDEY, SEPARATION AGREFEMNTS AND ANTL-
NUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 14 at 9. 10 (1977).
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